ABSTRACT Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) has been applied in constructing secure cloud storage for its simplicity, high-efficiency, and practicality. Recent works show that forward privacy has become a fundamental property required for SSE, and several forward secure dynamic SSE schemes supporting single-keyword search have been proposed. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no forward secure searchable encryption scheme supporting conjunctive-keyword search. In this paper, we propose two forward secure SSE schemes with conjunctive-keyword search functionality. Technically, in our basic scheme, we introduce a bloom filter on the client side to check the existence of keywords in a file. This also makes it easy to delete a file in locality rather than on the server side. In order to avoid the false positive probability of the bloom filter and reduce the redundant search results, we further propose a construction by applying secret-key inner-product encryption. Both of our schemes achieve sub-linear efficiency and oneround communication in the search protocol. Moreover, our methods are generic, as they can be applied to any forward secure single-keyword searchable encryption scheme to obtain a conjunctive-keyword one.
I. INTRODUCTION
Searchable encryption is a significant cryptographic primitive for cloud security. It enables a client to outsource his encrypted dataset to the cloud, meanwhile maintains his ability to perform the keyword-based search on the encrypted data. Among each category of searchable encryption constructions, Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) has been paid special importance for its simplicity, high-efficiency, and practicality [1] - [3] .
Generally, in an SSE scheme, there is an encryption algorithm which takes as input an index and a sequence of n files f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) and outputs an encrypted index and a sequence of n ciphertexts c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ). To search for a keyword w, the client generates a search token τ w and sends
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it to the cloud. With τ w , the cloud can find (with an encrypted search algorithm) the desired file and send it to the client. During these phases, the cloud learns some partial information about the encrypted dataset and the issued keywords. Except for the aforementioned functionalities, Dynamic Symmetric Searchable Encryption (DSSE) enables the client to add and delete data items after the dataset is outsourced to the cloud. It extends the functionality of classical SSE schemes and captures a wide range of real-world applications.
However, the extended functionality leads to new security concerns. As a severe security threat, for example, adding a file f to the database might reveal that, among the keywords that were searched before, which of them are contained in f . Accordingly, schemes that can avoid such information leakage is termed as forward private. A DSSE scheme that does not achieve forward privacy is vulnerable to file-injection attacks [4] , thus forward privacy has been a crucial property for DSSE construction. In CCS' 16 Bost [5] presents the oφoς , a landmark contribution in forward private DSSE construction. On top of oφoς , this work takes in-depth research on forward secure DSSE constructions and proposed two DSSE schemes with conjunctive-keyword search.
A. RELATED WORK 1) SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION
The goal of searchable encryption(SE) is to achieve practical efficiency with a price of well-defined small leakage. Searchable encryption starts from the seminal paper by Song et al. [6] . After that, a line of works were proposed [7] - [16] . Among them, Curtmola et al. [9] gave the first inverted-index based scheme with sub-linear efficiency. The schemes also formalized the well-adapted security definition for arguing the security of SE schemes nowadays. Chase and Kamara [17] also proposed a similar index-based scheme but with a higher storage complexity.
The early SE schemes only focus on static setting, not suitable in many application scenarios where updates are required. In fact, the above static schemes can be modified for supporting update, but usually not efficient. The first efficient dynamic search encryption scheme is proposed by Kamara et al. [10] as an improvement of [9] . Their scheme achieves sub-linear search time and enables update by leveraging a forward index. The procedure for modifying the index during the update is complex and also leaks much more information to the server than [9] . Kamara and Papamanthou [11] proposed a parallel SE scheme, which leaks less information but increases round complexity. Similarly, Hahn and Kerschbaum [18] proposed a scheme with efficient update by leveraging both forward and inverted index. Naveed et al. [19] constructed a DSSE scheme based on a new primitive called blind-storage, which achieves less information leakage but is less efficient than index-based schemes.
Some other works focused on the practical performance of searchable encryption. In [12] , Cash et al. proposed some data structure as well as design principle for improving the search efficiency of searchable encryption. Recently, it has been found that I/O plays a more important role for performance especially when the encrypted index is large. Cash and Tessaro [20] proved that achieving optimal storage, read efficiency and locality simultaneously is impossible under the security requirement of [9] . After that, many works aiming at improving I/O efficiency were proposed [21] - [24] . Miers and Mohassel [25] came up with a DSSE scheme by using oblivious update index, which achieves a higher concrete I/O efficiency than pure ORAM-based schemes.
2) MULTI-KEYWORD SEARCH
Just enabling single-keyword search is not enough for many searching scenarios, some works focusing on the expressiveness of searchable encryption, such as range search, conjunctive search and more general Boolean search, were proposed.
As one of the promising functionality for searchable encryption, multi-keyword search can be obtained by only using a single-keyword SE in a black-box way, but this approach usually cannot meet the efficiency requirement and brings too much leakage. Some efficient schemes with less leakage are proposed. As for conjunctive search, Moataz and Shikfa [26] proposed a searchable encryption scheme supporting boolean query, but the search efficiency of the construction is O(n) where n is the number of documents. Cash et al. [27] proposed a scheme supporting conjunctive search by leveraging Oblisious Corss-Tag (OXT) protocol, which divides conjunctive search request into s-term and x-terms. The s-term is for a regular single-keyword search and x-terms are used to filter out unnecessary document identifiers such that only those contains all the keywords are returned, which can achieve sub-linear search for conjunctive search. The OXT protocol can be extended to process any form of Boolean query, but it takes time linear in the number of documents in the worst case. The problem then was addressed by Kamara and Moataz [28] in which they proposed two constructions LEX-2Lev and LEX-ZMF, both achieve sublinear time search for Boolean query even in worst case. The LEX-2Lev construction optimizes search time at a price of storage overhead and LEX-ZMF reduces the expense by leveraging a new encrypted bloom filter variant. Very recently, Lai et al. [29] proposed a new conjunctive searchable encryption. The scheme avoids result pattern leakage in [27] by leveraging Bloom filter and a lightweight Hidden Vector Encryption(HVE) that only uses efficient symmetrickey primitives, which strictly improves the security level without introducing large storage and computational overhead. In terms of multi-client setting, Sun et al. [30] proposed a multi-client version of Dynamic SSE scheme that supports Boolean query.
3) FORWARD PRIVACY
Informally, a searchable encryption scheme with forward privacy requires that an update request leaks no information about the updated keyword. In fact, an early work from Chang and Mitzenmacher [8] supports forward privacy, but the communication complexity for search is linear in the number of updates to the searched keyword. The concept of forward privacy of SE was first precisely introduced by Stefanov et al. [31] in which they also proposed the concept of backward privacy. They designed a forward private DSSE scheme based on hierarchical ORAM, but improved the efficiency by allowing small intrinsic leakage of searchable encryption. Likewise, Garg et al. [32] proposed the first efficient round-optimal oblivious RAM(ORAM) scheme to construct a DSSE scheme with sub-linear search efficiency without search pattern leakage. However, the scheme is only theoretical interest and is not practical for real-world use. It is until in 2016 that Bost proposed the first forward private SE scheme oφoς [5] with optimal communication and computational complexity by a novel use of trapdoor permutation. After that, a line of works aiming to obtain forward security only using symmetric-key primitives has been proposed [33] - [37] .
The only work on forward privacy for multi-keyword search, as far as we know, is the scheme from Zuo et al. [38] in which they proposed two forward private SE schemes for range query. The first construction combines oφoς with a tree-like structure to support range search while the second one replaces oφoς with a bit-string encrypted by Paillier encryption, which also supports backward privacy as they claimed. Until now, there is no forward secure searchable encryption supporting conjunctive search is ever proposed.
B. CONTRIBUTION
From the related works, we can see that there are several efficient forward secure single-keyword searchable encryption schemes. Naturally, we might expect to build forward secure conjunctive-keyword searchable encryption based on these schemes which can achieve sub-linear efficiency and oneround communication. Our work started with this expectation and construct two new searchable encryption schemes. The main contributions are as follows:
1) We propose a basic forward secure conjunctivekeyword searchable encryption based on oφoς [5] which is a forward secure single-keyword searchable encryption scheme. This is a somewhat trivial extension. To achieve conjunctive-keyword search, in update protocol, we build encrypted indexes of a file for each contained keyword and let the client keep a bloom filter in locality which can record the existence of a keyword in a file index. In search protocol, after receiving the potential indexes from the server, the client can check the bloom filter for each (keyword,index) pair to obtain the actual indexes containing all the keywords. The method for constructing the basic scheme seems somewhat trivial, but we find that it can support easy deletion operation just on the client side. This also reduces the communication overheads in update protocol. 2) We propose an enhanced scheme to avoid the false positive probability of bloom filter on the client side and prevent the server from returning redundant results. We apply inner-product encryption (IPE) scheme in oφoς [5] . In update protocol, we form a vector representing the existence of all the contained keywords in a file ind and compute the IPE cipher wc of it which will be a part of the encrypted index of ind. In search protocol, the search token in oφoς is extended by adding a secret key generated by the IPE scheme for a vector representing all the queried keywords. Then, the server can test the inclusion for conjunctive keywords by implementing the decryption algorithm of the IPE scheme taking as inputs the secret key and wc.
In this enhanced scheme, we get rid of bloom filter so that the false positive probability of bloom filter can be prevented. However, the scheme can only support the efficient search for limited number of keywords, as the implementation time of the inner-product encryption algorithms almost increases linearly with the number of keywords. By the evaluation, the acceptable number of keywords may be less than 500. It suits well for certain scenarios where the number of keywords is moderate. 3) Both schemes achieve one-round communication in search protocol. Also, the sub-linear efficiency is achieved as they are based on the inverted index data structure. Moreover, they hide the searching results by building the encrypted database based on the index ciphertext encrypted using a symmetric-key encryption scheme. 4) Actually, although both of our schemes are constructed based on oφoς [5] , they can be constructed based on any forward secure single-keyword searchable encryption scheme, i.e., our methods are generic for constructing forward secure conjunctive-keyword searchable encryption scheme. Table 1 gives the comparison with related works.
C. ORGANIZATION
The rest paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we introduce the model, definitions, and preliminaries of our work. Then, we propose a basic construction of forward secure conjunctive-keyword searchable encryption in Section III. In Section IV, we propose our enhanced scheme. We evaluate the performances of our schemes in Section V. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. FORMULATION AND PRELIMINARIES

A. SYMMETRIC SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION
To describe the model of symmetric searchable encryption, we use the same symbols as [37] . In the SSE scenario, there VOLUME 7, 2019 are two parties: the data owner (called client) of the plaintext database and a cloud service provider (called server) that stores the encrypted database. A plaintext database
is a tuple of index/keyword-set pairs with ind i ∈ {0, 1} l and W i ⊆ {0, 1} * . The set of keywords of the database A dynamic symmetric searchable encryption scheme for conjunctive-keyword search = (Setup,Search,Update) consist of one algorithm and two protocols between a client and a server:
• Setup(DB) is an algorithm run by client. It takes as input a plaintext database DB. It output a pair (EDB, K , σ ) where K is a secret key, EDB the encrypted database stored by server, and σ the client's state.
•
) is a protocol between the client with input the key K , its state σ , and a search query q, and the server with input EDB. For conjunctive-keyword search schemes, a search query is restricted to multiple keywords w 1 ∧ · · · ∧ w n .
) is a protocol between the client with input the key K , its state σ , an operation op and an input in parsed as the index ind and a set W of keywords, and the server with input EDB. The update operations are taken from the set {add, del}, meaning, respectively, the addition and the deletion of a document/keyword-set pair.
We say that is computationally correct with false positive rate if the search protocol return the correct result for every query, except with negligible probability. Security Definition: Here, we describe the security definition for SSE from [37] . To achieve efficiency, it is inevitable for the searchable encryption schemes to leak some information to the server. Therefore, a searchable encryption scheme is regarded as a secure one if no more information is leaked than allowed. Formally, the security of searchable encryption is captured by using the simulation paradigm and providing the simulator a set of predefined leakage functions
Definition 1 (Adaptively Secure Searchable Encryption): Let = (Setup,Search,Update) be a searchable encryption scheme, A be an adversary, S be a simulator parameterized with leakage function L = {L Setup , L Search , L Update }. We define the following two probabilistic experiments:
• Real A (λ): The adversary A chooses a database DB, the experiment runs Setup (DB) and returns EDB to A. Then, the adversary adaptively chooses a query list q i . If q i is a search query then the experiment answers the query by running Search (K , q i , σ ; EDB), and stores the resulted transcript. If q i is an update query then the experiment answers the query by running Update (K , σ, op, in; EDB). Finally, the adversary A output a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
• Ideal A,S (λ): The adversary A chooses a database DB. Given the leakage function L Setup , the simulator S generates an encrypted database EDB ← S(L Setup (DB)) and returns it to A. Then, the adversary adaptively chooses queries a query list q i . If q i is a search query then the simulator answers the query by running Search(L Search (q i )). If q i is an update query then the simulator answers the query by running Update(L Update (q i )). Finally, the adversary A output a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
We say is an L-adaptively-secure searchable encryption scheme [37] if for any probabilistic, polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A, there exists a PPT simulator S such that:
Forward privacy is a strong property for DSSE which requires that an update query leaks no information about the updated keyword. The formal definition is as the following:
Definition 2 (Forward Privacy [37] ): An L-adaptivelysecure SSE scheme is forward private if for an update query
where op i is the update operation and ind i is the file index.
B. BLOOM FILTERS
A Bloom filter is a bit array of m bits to represent a set S = {s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s N } [29] . All the bits of a bloom filter is initially set to 0. To set a bloom filter for S, k independent hash functions with domain S and range [m], {H i } 1≤i≤k are chosen, and the bits at positions {H i (s)} 1≤i≤k are changed to 1. To test whether an element q is in S, we can get k positions by computing {H i (q)} 1≤i≤k and test if the bit at any position is 0. If so, we conclude q / ∈ S. Otherwise, q ∈ S with high probability unless q yields a false positive event. The false positive probability of a m-bit Bloom filter is approximately (1 − e k·N m ) k .
C. FUNCTION-HIDING INNER PRODUCT ENCRYPTION
In our SSE scheme, we use the function-hiding inner product encryption (IPE) scheme in [39] . Here, we recall the definition of function-hiding inner product encryption in [39] .
A secret-key inner product encryption scheme is a tuple of algorithms IPE=(Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt) defined over a message space Z q n with the following properties:
• Setup (1 λ , S → (pp, msk)): takes as input a security parameter λ and a set S ⊆ Z q . It outputs the public parameters pp and a master secret key msk.
• KeyGen (msk, x) → sk x : takes as input a vector x ∈ Z n q , the master secret key msk. It outputs a functional secret key sk x .
• Encrypt (msk, y) → ct y : takes as input a vector y, and the master secret key msk. It outputs the ciphertext ct y .
• Decrypt (sk, ct) → z: takes as input a functional secret key sk corresponding to a vector x and a ciphertext ct associated with a vector y. It outputs the inner product < x, y > if x, y ∈ Z n q \ {0} and < x, y >∈ S. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥. In [39] , simulation-based security of IPE was introduced by defining the real experiment and the ideal experiment as follows:
The Real Experiment. The real experiment for a secretkey IPE scheme involves a challenger C and a stateful PPT adversary A, who interact as follows:
• Setup phase: The challenger C runs IPE.Setup (1 λ ) and outputs (pp,msk). Then C sends pp to the adversary A and keeps msk itself.
• Query phase: The adversary A can adaptively issue any number of the following queries: Key generation query. A chooses a vector x, and receives sk x ← IPE.KeyGen(msk, x) from C. Encryption query. A chooses a vector y, and receives ct y ←IPE.Encrypt(msk, x) from C.
• Guess: The adversary A outputs b ∈ {0, 1}.
The Ideal Experiment. The ideal experiment for a secretkey IPE scheme involves a stateful PPT simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ) and a stateful PPT adversary A, who interact as follows:
• Setup phase: S 1 generates the simulator public parameter pp and a simulator state st. pp is sent to A. S 1 also initializes two set X ← {}, Y ← {} to record the queried vectors x and y. S 1 set two counters i = 0, j = 0 to record the number of the queried x and y respectively.
which is initialized to the empty set.
• Query phase: The adversary A can adaptively issue any number of the following queries: Key generation query. In the i th query, A chooses a vector x (i) , and sends it to S. S sets i ← i + 1, updates the collection of mappings C ip , and invokes (sk x i , st ) ← S 2 (C ip , st). Set st ← st and replies to A with sk x (i) . Encryption query. In the j th query, A chooses a vector y (j) , and sends it to S. S sets j ← j + 1, updates the collection of mappings C ip , and invokes (ct y j , st ) ← S 3 (C ip , st). Set st ← st and replies to A with ct y (j) .
• Guess: The adversary A outputs b ∈ {0, 1}. A secret-key IPE scheme is said to be simulation-secure (SIM-secure) if for all PPT adversaries A, the two experiments above are computationally indistinguishable.
In [39] , a function-hiding inner-product encryption was proposed and proved to be simulation-secure in the generic group model which is somewhat similar to the random oracle model. Here, we describe the construction. Fix a security parameter λ ∈ N, and let n be a positive integer. Let S be a polynomial-sized subset of Z q , the IPE construction is as follows:
• Setup(1 λ , S): On input the security parameter λ, the setup algorithm samples an asymmetric bilinear
, S and the master secret key msk = (pp, g 1 , g 2 , B, B * ).
• KeyGen(msk, x): On input the master secret key msk and a vector x ∈ Z n q , the key generation algorithm chooses a uniformly random element α
. Note that the second component is a vector of group elements.
• Encrypt(msk, y): On input the master secret key msk and a vector y ∈ Z n q , the encryption algorithm chooses a uniformly random element β
).
• Decrypt(sk, ct): On input the public parameters pp, a secret key sk = (K 1 , K 2 ) and a ciphertext ct = (C 1 , C 2 ), the decryption algorithm computes
If so, the decryption algorithm outputs z. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
III. BASIC CONSTRUCTION: A SOMEWHAT INTUITIVE METHOD A. THE IDEA
Our construction is an extension of the scheme oφoς from [5] which is a forward secure single-keyword searchable encryption based on the inverted index data structure. Before discussing how we construct our scheme, we first recall the oφoς construction at a high level. The oφoς construction is an inverted index scheme making use of a pseudorandom functions F, a trapdoor permutation π , and two keyed hash functions H 1 and H 2 with different output length. It builds for each keyword w an indexed list of matching documents (ind 0 , · · · , ind n w ) where n w is the number of documents in the list. Then it encrypts all the documents in the list and stores each element ind c at a logical location UT c (w) derived from w and c, i.e., UT c (w) = H 1 (F(K S , w), π (ST c−1 ) ). When the client wants to add a new document with keyword w, he computes a new logical location UT n w +1 (w) and encrypts the document index as e, and sends (UT n w +1 (w), e) to the server. The client keeps an array W which maps every inserted keyword to its current search token ST c (w) and the counter c = n w − 1. When the client issues a search query for the keyword w, he will generate and send a search token ST c (w) and a counter c to the server by which the server can recompute the logical location of entries matching w. As the update token UT c+1 is computed from a new search token ST c+1 , the server cannot link a newly added data with an old search token ST c+1 which guarantees the forward security of oφoς . Fig. 1 . shows the data structures of oφoς . To support conjunctive-keyword search, we slightly modify the structure by computing the encrypted ind as e c = (Sym.Enc (F(K S , w) −1 ) ) and VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 1. The data structure of oφoς . FIGURE 2. The data structure of our basic scheme.
adding a bloom filter in client side for all the files representing the keywords contained in files. Fig. 2 . demonstrates the new structure for conjunctive-keyword search. Note that in our scheme, if a file ind contains n different keywords, we will build n index items for it.
B. THE SCHEME Let Sym=(Enc, Dec) be a symmetric key encryption and IPE=(Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt) be an innerproduction encryption. Algorithm 1 gives the description of our scheme.
C. SECURITY
In our scheme, we consider conjunctive queries as ψ(w) = w 1 ∧ · · · ∧ w l . We require L Setup = ⊥, i.e., the Setup protocol leaks nothing. For the Search protocol, note that the client only sends search token of one keyword w s 1 to the server, although our scheme is a conjunctive-keyword searchable encryption scheme. The encrypted indexes of keyword w s 1 are leaked. Therefore, if we denote CDB w to the encrypted indexes of the keyword w and KW ind to the keywords contained in file ind, we can define the query pattern qp and the search pattern sp as follows. More formally, L Search keeps as state the query list Q, which contains all queries q i so far, and whose entries are (i, w i 1 ), if q i is a search query and the first keyword in q i is w i 1 
is an update query and u =| KW ind i |. The search pattern is defined as sp(w) = {j|(j, w) ∈ Q, i.e., in search query q j in Q, the search token sent to server is for keyword w}. Now, we can define L Search (w) = (sp(w), qp(Q)).
For convenience, we will use search pattern sp(w) and update history uh(w) instead of using the search leakage function L Search (w) directly. Here, uh(w) = {(j, op j , ctind w , |KW ind j |)|(i, op j , ind j ) ∈ Q, i.e., in update query q j in Q, the leaked ciphertext of file index ind j is encrypted by the key of w} can be constructed from L Search (w). Therefore, we can re-define L Search (w) as (sp(w), uh(w)).
Here, we show the security of our scheme. Theorem 1: Let F be a secure pseudorandom function, π be a one-way trapdoor permutation. Proof: We can prove the indistinguishability between Real A (λ) and Ideal A,S (λ) similar to that in [5] by several hybrid indistinguishable games from Real A (λ) to Ideal A,S (λ).
Game 0 : is exactly the Real A (λ) game. Game 1 : is like real Game 0 except that we replace the PRF F with a randomness. Specifically, Game 1 chooses a random key K w when it is generating K w for a new w instead of calling F. Then, it stores K w to a table Key to reuse it next time w is queried. Game 1 and Game 0 are indistinguishable by the indistinguishability between pseudorandom function F and a truly random function, i.e.,
Game 2 : is like Game 1 except that we replace the hash function H 1 with a random strings. Then, the random string is used to program the random oracle in Search protocol. In details, firstly, in the Update protocol, it chooses a random strings stored in a CT ← e ⊕ H 2 (K w s 1 , ST i ); 13: Add CT to CT ; 14:
15: Send CT to Client; Client: 16: for each CT in CT do 17: ind←Sym.Dec(K w s 1 , CT ); 18: for each q in {s 2 , · · · , s l } do 19: flag ←True;
20:
Tag ← H 3 (K w q , ind), 21: for j = 1 to k do 22: if BF[H j (Tag)] == 0 then 23: flag ←False; 24: break; 25: if flag == False then 26: break; continue to next CT 27: if flag == True then 28: Add ind to IN D; for j = 1 to k do 8: BF [H j (Tag[v] )] ← 1; Add (UT c+1 , e) to UT E
9:
v ← v + 1; 10: Send UT E to the server; Ideal A,S (λ): in this game, a simulator must generate a view given only the leakage functions, but not the actual data and queries. Recall that L Search (w) = (sp(w), uh(w)). The simulator can execute exactly as that in Algorithm 3. The view produced by the simulator is perfectly indistinguishable from the one produced in Game 5 . Therefore, we can get that Game 5 and Ideal A,S (λ) are indistinguishable.
In summary, Real A (λ) and Ideal A,S (λ) are indistinguishable.
D. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
We analyze the complexity of the basic scheme in terms of the server side index size, read efficiency, locality and the clientside storage and computation. As we build an encrypted index of a file ind for each contained keyword, the server side index size is N · len bits where N is the number of document/keyword pairs in the index and len is the identifier ciphertext's size. To answer a search query with conjunctive keywords w s 1 ∧ · · · ∧ w s l , our scheme needs to read c · len bits, where c is the number of updates that contain w s 1 . The locality is c because the c entries are located randomly in the v ← v + 1; 9: Send UT E to the server; encrypted index. To check the bloom filter, the client needs to compute at most (l − 1) · (k + 1) hash functions, where l is the number of queried keywords and k is the number of hash functions used to set bloom filter. Although our scheme is for conjunctive-keyword search, it has the same complexity in server side compared with the single-keyword search scheme in [5] . However, the client has to store a bloom filter locally and do some local computations to check whether the returned index contains all the queried keywords.
E. DELETION SUPPORT
The deletion operation can be easily supported: if a file ind with keywords (w u 1 , · · · , w u t ) will be deleted, the client only needs to set the corresponding position of the kept bloom filter to 0, i.e., the Update protocol is implemented as follows.
IV. THE ENHANCED CONSTRUCTION
In the scheme above, the client has to store and check a bloom filter locally, which will be a waste of storage and computation resources for a resource-limited client. Moreover, as there is false positive probability in the membership test of a bloom filter, the basic scheme may make mistakes
Tag ← H 3 (K w q , ind); 4: for j = 1 to k do 5: BF[H j (Tag)] ← 0; Server: 6: Do nothing; FIGURE 3. The data structure of our enhanced scheme.
in the Search protocol. On the server side, it returns some redundant indexes in an execution of the Search protocol, which may increase the communication overheads. To avoid these flaws, we will extend the search token of our basic scheme to make the server exactly returns indexes containing the conjunctive keywords. To this end, we first pre-define a keyword space and sort the keywords. Let n be the number of all keywords. Then, if a file ind contains t keywords (w u 1 , · · · , w u t ), we apply a vector w ∈ Z n q to ind where w[u i ] ← 1 and get the ciphertext wc of w by encrypting it using an Inner-Product Encryption (IPE) scheme. To support forward privacy, we XOR wc with H 3 (K w u i , ST c,w u i ). Let cwc be the ciphertext of wc. The encrypted index of ind will be e as the basic scheme and cwc. In Search protocol, if the queried keywords are (w s 1 , · · · , w s l ), we first generate search token as the basic scheme, i.e., (K w s 1 , ST c , c) . Then generate a secret key mtoken for a vector w ∈ {0, 1} n where w[s i ] ← 1 using IPE scheme. The search token of the enhanced scheme will be (K w s 1 , ST c , c, mtoken, l) . The server firstly implements search operation as the basic scheme and obtains all the encrypted indexes with the ciphertext of the vector representing the conjunctive keywords of each index matching keyword w s 1 , i.e., (e, cwc) pairs. Then it can XOR cwc with H 3 (K w s 1 , ST i ) to get wc and implement res ←IPE.Decrypt(mtoken, wc). If res == l, it returns e ⊕ H 2 (K w s 1 , ST i ) as an encrypted index matching queried conjunctive keywords. Fig. 3 . shows the data structure of our enhanced construction. 
16:
res ←IPE.Decrypt(mtoken,wc); 18: if res == l then 19: CT ← e ⊕ H 2 (K w s 1 , ST i ); 20: Add CT to CT ; 21: ST i−1 ← π PK (ST i ); 22: Send CT to Client; Client: 23: ind←Sym.Dec(K w s 1 , CT ); 24: Add ind to IN D;
A. THE SCHEME Let W = {w 1 , · · · , w n } be a pre-defined keyword space and i is the order of the keyword w i . Let Sym=(Enc, Dec) be a symmetric key encryption. Algorithm 4 gives the description of our enhanced scheme.
B. SECURITY
In the enhanced scheme, we require L Setup is as the same as that in the basic scheme. For the Search protocol, note that the client sends a search token of one keyword w s 1 to the server with additional information about queried keywords, i.e., the secret key generated by the Inner-Product Encryption scheme for a vector representing the queried keywords and the number of them. As the basic scheme, the encrypted indexes of keyword w s 1 are actually leaked. In the enhanced scheme, the number of queried keywords and the encrypted indexes matching the queried keywords are leaked. Also, Algorithm 4 (Continued.) Enhanced Forward Secure SSE Scheme Supporting Conjunctive-Keyword Search Update(add, w u 1 ∧ · · · w u t ,ind,σ ;EDB) Client: 1: Initialize a vector w ∈ Z n q ← 0 n ; 2: for each i in {u 1 , · · · , u t } do 3: Set w[i] ← 1; 4: wc =IPE.Encrypt(MSK, w); 5: Initialize UT E ← {}; 6: for each q in {u 1 , · · · , u t } do 7 :
if (ST c , c) = ⊥ then 10:
else 12 :
13: 
Add (UT c+1 , e, cwc) to UT E; 18: Send UT E to the server; Server: 19: for each (UT c+1 , e, cwc) in UT E do 20: 
is an update query and u =| KW ind i |. Here, (ct ind i j , nmkw i j ) means that in search query i, the number of matched keywords in file ind i j is nmkw i j . The search pattern sp can be defined as sp(w) = {j|(j, w, l) ∈ Q, i.e., in search query q j in Q, the search token sent to server is for keyword w and the number of queried keywords is l}. The update history uh(w) will contain an additional information of the ciphertext generated by the Inner-Product Encryption scheme for a vector representing the keywords included in the file index. That is to say, uh(w) = {(j, op j , ctind w , |KW ind j |, wc)|(i, op j , ind j ) ∈ Q, i.e., in update query q j in Q, the leaked ciphertext of file index ind j is encrypted by the key of w} can be constructed from L Search (w). We also define the matching history as mh(w) = {(i, CDB(w, i), CNMKW(w, i))} which can be constructed from the query pattern. Then the leakage function L Search (w) can be written as L Search (w) = (sp(w), uh(w), mh(w)).
Here, we show the security of our scheme. Theorem 2: Let F be a secure pseudorandom function, π be a one-way trapdoor permutation and IPE be a SIM-secure function-hiding inner-product encryption scheme. Define Game 5 : Algorithm 5 formally describe this game. Note that we can get rid of the codes of server's part and client's locally computation part in Search protocol, as these codes do not influence the transcript. The main difference between Game 5 and Game 4 is that in Game 5 the search token ST is generated randomly when search is performed. To this end, the search token ST is not generate/updated in Update. ST 0 is generated when a search query of keyword w is issued for the first time and ST i can be generated from ST 0 by iterating π −1 SK . Also, a table Update is used to record all the update requests since the last search query. The changes however are not observable by the adversary. Therefore, Game 5 and Game 4 are indistinguishable.
Ideal A,S (λ): in this game, a simulator must generate a view given only the leakage functions, but not the actual data and queries. Recall that L Search (w) = (sp(w), uh(w)). Let S IPE = (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ) be the simulator of the Inner-Product Encryption (IPE) scheme. The simulator can execute exactly as that in Algorithm 6. The view produced by the simulator is perfectly indistinguishable from the one produced in Game 5 . Therefore, we can get that Game 5 and Ideal A,S (λ) are indistinguishable. In summary, Real A (λ) and Ideal A,S (λ) are indistinguishable. v ← v + 1; 13: Send UT E to the server;
C. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
Compared with the basic scheme, we can analyze the complexity of the enhanced scheme from two aspects, i.e., the client side and the server side. On the client side, for update, the client needs to compute an additional IPE ciphertext for a vector w ∈ Z n q which may cost hundreds of milliseconds by the benchmarks showed in [39] , if there are about hundreds of pre-defined keywords. The communication overheads increase as it will send to the server auxiliary information about the existence of keywords in the file. But the client if ct ind i ∈ {ct ind k 0 , · · · , ct ind km } then 14: cnt ← l; 15: else 16: cnt ← nmkw i ; 17: for i = 0 to cnt do 18: Set v ← v + 1; 13: Send UT E to the server; does not need to keep in locality a bloom filter. For search, the client needs to compute an IPE secret key for a vector VOLUME 7, 2019 which may also cost hundreds of milliseconds. As a result, the client can get rid of the computation for checking a bloom filter. On the server side, the storage of encrypted indexes increases about dozens of kilobytes for each index. It has to implement O(c) IPE decryption to check the inclusion of the conjunctive keywords which may need O(c) seconds. In return, the communication overheads decrease as it does not send redundant indexes. The increase of computational overheads on the server side is acceptable if it can reduce the overheads of the client.
D. DELETION SUPPORT
To support deletion operation, we first define a special keyword w 0 which is not contained in all the files. Then in Update protocol in Algorithm 4, the codes from line 2 to line 3 are changed to:
w[0] ← 1; The Search protocol in Algorithm 4 also needs to be changed. The codes from line 18 to line 20 are changed to:
CT ← e ⊕ H 2 (K w s 1 , ST i ); if res == l then Add CT to CT ; else if CT ∈ CT then Delete CT from CT ;
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performances of our schemes. As our schemes are extensions of oφoς [5] , we can only evaluate the extended parts of them and the total performance of the schemes can be computed by adding the extended overheads to that of oφoς . From our evaluation, the update time for an index in oφoς is 8ms. The search times for a keyword with different number of matching indexes are showed in Fig. 4. A. BASIC SCHEME In our basic scheme, the extended part is the index existence testing operations, i.e., the client implements a hash operation and setting/checking operations of the bloom filter. The evaluation is performed on a personal computer with Intel Core i5-6300 CPU, and 4GB of DDR3 RAM. For the bloom filter, we set N to be database size, i.e., N = 10 6 . We set k = 20, m = 30 * 10 6 , then the false positive probability is about 10 −6 . 
B. ENHANCED SCHEME
The extended parts in our enhanced scheme are described as follows:
1) In Update protocol, the client implements IPE.Encrypt once. 2) In Search protocol, to generate a token, the client implements additional IPE.KeyGen operation. 3) In Search protocol, the server implements additional IPE.Decrypt operation for each index to check the inclusion of the keywords in it.
Therefore, we only need to evaluate the times of IPE algorithms. We realize the secret-key IPE scheme in [39] based on Java Pairing based Cryptography(JPBC) library. We use the curve y 2 = x 3 +x over the field F q where q is a 160-bit prime. The evaluation is performed on a personal computer with Intel Core i5-6300 CPU, 4GB of DDR3 RAM and Window 10 operation system. Fig. 6 . shows the times of IPE operations. Compared with the benchmarks of IPE [39] showed in Fig. 7 ., the implementation times in the evaluation are much slower as our evaluation is implemented in a poor hardware environment. However, it is obvious that the implementation times will be much better if the evaluation is implemented in a much better hardware environment such as a cloud server in practical scenario.
From the evaluation, we can see that our enhanced scheme can only support efficient search for limited number of keywords with advantages of avoiding the false positive probability of bloom filter on the client side, and preventing the server from returning redundant results. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose two forward secure searchable encryption schemes supporting conjunctive-keyword search as an initial attempt. Specifically, in our first scheme, we introduce bloom filter kept by the client into a forward secure single-keyword searchable encryption scheme oφoς to check the existence of multiple keywords in a file. As a good property, it supports easy deletion operation in locality. The evaluation shows it is an efficient construction. To prevent the server from returning redundant results and avoid the false positive probability of bloom filter, we apply secret-key inner-product encryption in oφoς and obtain an enhanced scheme. As IPE operations take up most of the implementation times in our enhanced scheme, we need much more efficient IPE schemes to improve the performance of it. In both schemes, if a file ind has u keywords, we will build an encrypted index for each keyword, i.e., there will be u encrypted indexes for ind stored in the server. Maybe this is a waste of storage. We leave it an open problem how to construct forward secure conjunctive-keyword searchable encryption with no redundant storage.
